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Statement of Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
 This case originated in the Utah County Justice Court. Ordinarily, the defendant’s 
right to appeal would have been exhausted by exercising his right to trial de novo 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-118(8). However, the district court ruled on the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517 as applied to Defendant. Thus, this court 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-118(8) and Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(e). 
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review and Standards of Review 
 
Issue #1: Did the trial court err when it concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-
517(2) criminalizes operating a motor vehicle with non-impairing metabolites in the 
driver’s body? 
Standard of Review: The trial court’s ruling that § 41-6a-517(2) criminalizes 
driving with any metabolite of a controlled substance, regardless of whether that 
metabolite could impair the driver or not, is a question of statutory interpretation. 
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo, giving the trial court no 
particular deference. E.g., Becker v. Sunset City, 2013 UT 51, ¶ 11, 309 P.3d 223. 
 Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved by Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss where Defendant argued that under a set of stipulated facts, Defendant had not 
committed the offense charged. R. 51-72; 159-1751 
 Issue #2: Did the trial court interpret § 41-6a-517(2) in a manner that creates an 
																																																						
1 Hereinafter, “R.” shall be understood to be a citation to the Record on Appeal. 
	 2 
unconstitutional status offense as discussed in State v. Robinson, 2010 UT 30, ¶ 31, 254 
P.3d 183 by interpreting the statute to criminalize driving after having previously 
consumed controlled substances? 
 Standard of Review: This portion of the trial court’s ruling involves both 
statutory interpretation and constitutional interpretation, both of which are questions of 
law. Becker, 2010 UT 50 at ¶ 11; State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, ¶ 8, 232 P.3d 519. 
 Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved by Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss. R. 51-72; 159-175. 
 Issue #3: Did the trial court err by concluding that § 41-6a-517(2) did not violate 
Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution by creating disparate treatment without a rational 
basis between a driver who has non-impairing tetra-hydra-cannabinol (“THC”) 
metabolites in her body as a result of legal or involuntary consumption of THC and a 
driver with non-impairing metabolites in her body as a result of illegal consumption of 
THC? 
 Standard of Review: This issue poses a question of constitutional interpretation. 
Questions of constitutional interpretation are questions of law, reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, ¶ 8, 232 P.3d 519. 
 Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved by Defendant’s motion to 




Determinative Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517. Definitions - Driving with any measurable controlled 
substance in the body - Penalties - Arrest without warrant2 
 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) “Controlled substance” has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
(b) “Practitioner” has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
(c) “Prescribe” has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
(d) “Prescription” has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6a-502, a person may not 
operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state if the 
person has any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person’s body. 
 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the controlled 
substance was: 
 
(a) Involuntarily ingested by the accused; 
(b) Prescribed by a practitioner for use by the accused; or 
(c) Otherwise legally ingested. 
Utah Constitution: Article I, § 24 – Uniform operation of law 
 





2 Defendant reproduces only the pertinent portion of § 41-6a-517 here. The entire statute 
is voluminous, and therefore produced as Addendum 1. 
	 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case comes to the court following Defendant’s plea entered pursuant to State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988) and sentencing. The case was originally filed in Utah 
County Justice Court as Case number 145107472, where defendant was charged with 
driving with a measurable amount of controlled substances, a violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6a-517 (“the Metabolite Statute”). See R. 1. Defendant later plead guilty to an 
amended charge of impaired driving, and was sentenced by the justice court. R. 41-43. A 
timely notice of appeal to the district court was filed with the justice court. R. 4-5. 
 De novo proceedings were instituted in the Fourth District Court, Judge Claudia 
Laycock presiding in case number 145400088. R. 44. A motion to dismiss was filed on 
January 28, 2015. R. 51-72. The motion was based on facts that were stipulated for 
purposes of the motion. R. 52-53. Specifically, those facts were that Defendant was 
involved in an automobile accident and responding officers suspected him of driving 
under the influence of marijuana. R. 52. Field sobriety tests revealed that Defendant was 
not too impaired by any substance to drive safely. R. 52. Subsequent blood tests revealed 
that Defendant had a non-impairing metabolite of THC, 11-nor-9-carboxy-
tetrahydracannabinol, and no active THC in his system. R. 52. 
The motion to dismiss asserted that the plain language of the Metabolite Statute 
did not criminalize the act of driving with a non-impairing metabolite in the driver’s 
system. R. 54-76. The motion also asserted that the legislative history indicated an intent 
to criminalize driving with impairing metabolites, and not non-impairing metabolites. R. 
56-60. The motion further asserted that if the court disagreed with Defendant’s 
	 5 
construction of the Metabolite Statute, the plain language of the statute as applied to this 
case constitutes an unconstitutional status offense under the constitutional principles 
articulated in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 
(1962) as interpreted by the court in State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 31, 254 P.3d 183. 
R. 61-62. Finally, the motion also asserted that the Metabolite Statute violates the Utah 
Constitution’s uniform operation of law clause found in Article I, § 24. R. 63-66. 
After the motion was filed, the parties stipulated to an evidentiary hearing on the 
issues asserted in the motion. R. 88. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 17, 2015, 
where the State offered testimony from Trooper James Wright, the arresting officer, and 
Dr. Glen Hanson, an expert in the field of toxicology. R. 93. Dr. Hanson agreed that the 
THC metabolite found in Defendant’s blood is incapable of causing symptoms of 
impairment. R. 132:25-134:10. Dr. Hanson further testified that he did not believe the 
individual from whom the blood was taken would exhibit any signs of impairment from 
having previously consumed THC. 136:22-137:2. 
 Following the evidentiary hearing, a briefing schedule was set. The State filed an 
opposition on May 20, 2015, and Defendant filed a reply memorandum on June 2, 2015. 
R. 249-270; 271-285. Oral argument was held on June 10, 2015 and the matter was taken 
under advisement. R. 288-289. On July 1, 2015, the parties returned to court for 
announcement of the decision. R. 290-291. 
 The trial court first ruled that the plain language of the statute criminalizes driving 
with any metabolite of a controlled substance, irrespective of whether that metabolite 
could impair the driver, and denied the portion of the motion based on a plain language 
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statutory analysis. R. 301. The trial court then conducted a constitutional analysis, 
concluding that the statute does not arise to an impermissible status offense as defined in 
State v. Robinson because the status penalized under the Metabolite Status is that of a 
driver, and not of a drug addict. R. 302. 
 The trial court also concluded that the Metabolite Statute does not violate the 
uniform operation of law clause because, despite acknowledging that the statute does 
create disparate treatment between two classes of people, those classes are not similarly 
situated. R. 302. Specifically, the trial court concluded that because the two respective 
classes of people receive disparate treatment under the law, they are not similarly 
situated. R. 302. The trial court therefore ruled that Defendant had failed to make a 
threshold showing of disparate treatment of persons similarly situated, and that the 
Metabolite Statute passes uniform operation of law scrutiny. R. 303.  
The trial court further concluded that even if there was a threshold showing of 
disparate treatment of persons similarly situated, the legislature had a reasonable purpose 
for enacting the classification, such as discouraging illegal drug use or public safety. R. 
303. The trial court did not explain the nexus between the governmental purpose and the 
classification at issue, but stated in conclusory terms that “the relationship between the 
statute’s classification and the conceivable legislative objectives is also reasonable.” R. 
303. 
 As a result of these holdings, Defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied. R. 303. 
On the date set for bench trial, Defendant entered a plea pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935 (Utah 1988), preserving his right to appeal the trial court’s ruling on his motion 
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to dismiss. R. 331. This appeal followed. R. 341. 
Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented 
The essential facts upon which the trial court’s ruling rested are essentially 
undisputed, and consist of the following: 
1. On or about June 26, 2014, defendant was involved in a two-vehicle accident on I-
15 in Utah County, State of Utah. R. 160. 
2. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper James Wright responded to the accident site, and 
believed he saw and smelled signs of marijuana in Mr. Outzen’s vehicle. R. 160. 
3. Based on the smell, Trooper Wright searched the vehicle, but did not find any 
contraband. R. 160. 
4. Trooper Wright had Defendant stick out his tongue, which the Trooper noticed 
was covered with green mucus. R. 160. 
5. Trooper Wright administered field sobriety tests, and concluded that Defendant 
was not too impaired to drive. R. 160. 
6. Defendant admitted, however, that he had smoked marijuana some time the night 
prior. R. 177. Defendant was arrested for violation of the Metabolite Statute and 
consented to give a blood sample. R. 178. Subsequent blood testing revealed that 
Defendant’s blood contained an inactive THC metabolite, but no THC. R.160-161, 
180. 
7. At an evidentiary hearing in support of the motion to dismiss, the State called Dr. 
Glen Hanson, who conceded that the driver’s ability to perceive, process 
information, and respond physically to the perception are the functions with which 
	 8 
the question of impairment to drive a motor vehicle is concerned. R. 127:25-
128:19. 
8. Dr. Hanson also conceded that the THC metabolite in question in this case has no 
ability to impair an individual’s ability to perceive, process information, and 
respond physically to the perception at any known detectable level. R. 133:7-
134:10. 
9. Dr. Hanson further conceded that the person from whom the blood was drawn in 
this case would not exhibit any signs of impairment by virtue of having previously 
consumed THC. R. 136:22-137:2. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
	
In the present case, Defendant requests that this court reverse the trial court’s 
ruling on one of three points of law, any one of which requires reversal. First, Defendant 
requests that this court reverse the trial court’s ruling that the Metabolite Statute 
criminalizes driving with any metabolite in the driver’s system, whether that metabolite 
can impair the driver or not. Contrary to the trial court’s construction of the Metabolite 
Statute, the use of the clause, “in cases not amounting to a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6a-502 (“DUI Statute”) signals that the Metabolite Statute and DUI Statute have 
similar scopes of prohibited conduct. And because the DUI Statute acknowledges that 
impairment occurs on a spectrum, and that one only violates the DUI Statute if one passes 
a certain point on that spectrum, the Metabolite Statute also occupies space on the 
impairment continuum, but only in “cases not amounting to a violation of” the DUI 
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Statute. That is, the Metabolite Statute only contemplates impairing metabolites.  
Moreover, legislative history behind the Metabolite Statute supports this 
construction. Similarly, language substantially similar to the “in cases not amounting to” 
clause is found in other places in the criminal code, each of which is for the manifest 
purpose of establishing that the scope of prohibited conduct of the two statutes is similar, 
and not disparate. This construction is further supported by court of appeals precedent, 
which has interpreted substantially similar language to mean that the two statutes, while 
separate and distinct from each other, have related scopes of prohibited conduct. Thus, 
the trial court’s interpretation of the statute to the contrary was in error. And because the 
stipulated facts are that Defendant was not driving with an impairing metabolite in his 
system, was not too impaired to drive, and could not have exhibited any signs of 
impairment by virtue of his prior THC consumption, the trial court erred by denying the 
motion to dismiss. A ruling from this court reversing the trial court’s decision on this 
point would moot both points that follow.  
However, should this court rule against Defendant on the meaning of the statute, 
Defendant maintains that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, by way of 
imposing an unconstitutional status offense under Robinson v. California as interpreted 
by State v. Robinson. If the Metabolite Statute punishes a driver who has previously 
consumed, but is no longer under the influence of, THC, it is an unconstitutional status 
offense under Robinson v. California. Under such an interpretation, the Metabolite 
Statute would, under the facts of this case, punish Defendant because he might have 
	 10 
been3  previously under the influence of THC 
 Additionally, if the statute criminalizes driving with a non-impairing metabolite in 
the driver’s system, it violates the uniform operation of law clause of the Utah 
Constitution because it imposes disparate treatment upon persons similarly situated 
without a rational basis to support the classification. Specifically, it classifies between 
legal consumers of controlled substances and illegal consumers of controlled substances. 
The trial court held that this classification does not impose disparate treatment upon 
persons similarly situated because people whose conduct is illegal are not similarly 
situated to people whose conduct is legal. This reasoning is in error because if the fact of 
different treatment to different persons means that they are not similarly situated, it would 
empty the uniform operation of law clause of meaning. The trial court’s ruling and order 
was in error in this regard and the statute creates a distinction between similarly situated 
persons who have consumed marijuana some time prior to driving. 
 The legislative purpose of the Metabolite Statute is to promote public safety, 
which Defendant concedes is a proper legislative purpose. However, there is no rational 
basis supporting the classification in view of that legislative purpose. Under the facts of 
this case, Defendant posed no public safety risk by virtue of his prior THC consumption. 
More importantly, there is no principled reason to believe that Defendant posed a greater 
																																																						
3	While Defendant did admit to having smoked marijuana the night before, there was 
nothing before the trial court and nothing before this court to indicate how much he 
consumed, the extent of his impairment, or if he was ever impaired at all. The only facts 
before the court are that he had consumed an unspecified amount the night prior to the 
motor vehicle accident, and that he was not under its influence when field sobriety tests 
were administered, or when his blood was drawn. 
	 11 
public safety risk than would one who had consumed marijuana legally or involuntarily. 
Neither class of driver could be impaired by the prior consumption, and the legality or 
involuntariness of prior consumption cannot, from any reasonable vantage point, 
diminish the public safety risk --which is non-existent in the first instance. There is 
therefore no principled rationale to support the classification. 
 As a result, the Defendant’s rights to uniform operation of law were violated when 
the trial court denied his motion to dismiss. The trial court should be reversed and the 
matter remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and sentence, and dismiss the 




I. The Trial Court Erred When it Concluded that the Metabolite Statute 
Criminalizes Driving with any Metabolite in the Driver’s System, 
Irrespective of the Metabolite’s Ability to Impair the Driver. 
	
A. The Statute’s Plain Language Includes Impairment as an Essential 
Element of The Metabolite Statute. 
 
The trial court’s first ruling was that the Metabolite Statute criminalizes driving 
with any metabolite of a controlled substance, whether that metabolite has the potential to 
impair the driver or not. However, a closer analysis of the plain language reveals that this 
ruling was in error. In conducting this analysis, this court’s job is to interpret the statute 
according to the intent of the legislature. E.g., State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 34, 52 P.3d 
1210. The first place to look for the legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute 
itself. Id. While interpreting the plain language, the court assumes that the legislature 
used each term of the statute advisedly. Id. Similarly, the court interprets statutes in a 
manner that avoids surplus language and gives every word of the statute meaning. Heaps 
v. Nuriche, LLC, 2015 UT 26, ¶ 24 FN 6, 345 P3d 655, see also State v. Nguyen, 2012 
UT 80, ¶ 18, 293 P.3d 236 (referencing the “cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that 
we interpret statutes so that no part or provision will be inoperative or superfluous, void 
or insignificant, and that one section will not destroy another.”). The context of a statute 
is also a factor to be considered, so the court interprets the statute as a whole, and not in 
piecemeal fashion. Board of Educ. of Jordan School Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 
37, ¶ 14, 94 P.3d 234; State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1995). Furthermore, when 
confronted with a statute with more than one potential interpretation, the court should 
	 13 
avoid an unconstitutional interpretation. E.g., LKL Associates, 2004 UT 51, ¶ 9, 94 P.3d 
279. 
The trial court erroneously interpreted that plain language in this case. The 
dispositive statutory language in this case is as follows: 
In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6a-502, a person 
may not operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within this state if the person has any measurable controlled substance 
or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person’s body. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(2) (emphasis added). The trial court interpreted the portion 
of the Metabolite Statute emphasized above to negate any obligation to prove 
impairment. Put another way, the trial court interpreted the prefatory clause “[i]n cases 
not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6a-502” to mean that the Metabolite Statute 
does not distinguish between metabolites with the capacity to impair and metabolites 
without capacity to impair. Thus, the trial court interpreted the “[i]n cases not amounting 
to” clause to mean that the scope of prohibited conduct of the respective statutes is 
disparate.  
The trial court’s construction of that clause is incorrect because the only 
reasonable reading of the “[i]n cases not amounting to” clause is that the scope of 
prohibited conduct under the Metabolite Statute is necessarily similar to the scope of 
prohibited conduct under the DUI Statute. To read the “[i]n cases not amounting to” 
clause as the trial court did would be to leave that clause surplus verbiage. Utah long ago 
abolished common law crimes, which means that the scope of any crime must be defined 
strictly by the statute creating it. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (“no conduct is a crime 
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unless made so by this code. . .”). The default rule, therefore, is that the scope of 
prohibited conduct can only be found in the statute itself. Id.  
Against that backdrop, if the purpose of the clause “in cases not amounting to a 
violation” of the DUI Statute is to signal that the scope of prohibited conduct under the 
Metabolite Statute is not related to the scope of prohibited conduct under the DUI Statute, 
that language is superfluous because it accomplishes nothing that Section 76-1-105 does 
not accomplish. To illustrate the point, there is no need to specify that the Metabolite 
Statute’s scope of prohibited conduct includes cases not amounting to a violation of, for 
example, domestic violence or voyeurism because the criminal code is structured to 
preclude that necessity. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105. As a result, the trial court’s 
interpretation left the clause “[i]n cases not amounting to a violation. . .” surplus verbiage 
because it accomplishes nothing that Section 76-1-105 does not already accomplish. 
Interpreting statutes in a redundant and superfluous manner is a disfavored result under 
the canons of statutory construction. See e.g., Nguyen, 2012 UT 80 at ¶ 18. Thus, the trial 
court’s interpretation of that language is not consistent with well-established rules of 
statutory interpretation. 
The proper use of this canon of statutory interpretation leads to the conclusion that 
the Metabolite Statute can only be read to contemplate driving with impairing metabolites 
in the driver’s system. But to understand why, one must first understand the scope of 
prohibited conduct under the DUI Statute, which also requires an understanding of the 
principle that impairment is not a binary proposition, but occurs on a spectrum. Indeed, 
the law expressly acknowledges this reality because the DUI Statute allows a person to 
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drive with impairing substances in his or her system, provided that the influence of the 
substance(s) is/are not “to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating 
a vehicle. . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) (emphasis added).4 The plain language 
of the DUI Statute, therefore, acknowledges that impairment occurs by degree, and that a 
person only violates that statute when his or her impairment rises to a level that the 
person is incapable of safe operation of a vehicle. Id. Prior to the point of incapacity of 
safe operation of a vehicle, the person has not violated the statute. See id. 
 The Metabolite Statute also acknowledges that impairment occurs on a continuum 
because it applies only in cases “not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6a-502. . .” 
This phrase, by its reference to the DUI Statute, sets the scope of prohibited conduct 
under the Metabolite Statute on the same spectrum identified in the DUI Statute. The 
DUI Statute’s scope begins at the point the driver becomes incapable of safe operation of 
a vehicle, but does not include impairment that does not render the driver incapable of 
operating a vehicle safely. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(b). The Metabolite Statute 
covers those ranges of impairment because it applies in cases “not amounting to a 
violation of” the DUI Statute. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(b)(“A person 
may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person: is under the influence of . . . any drug. . . to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. . . .” with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(2)(“In 
																																																						
4	The DUI Statute also prohibits driving with a blood alcohol content greater than 0.08. 
However, because this case does not involve alcohol, only the portions of the DUI Statute 
related to controlled substances will be discussed. 
	 16 
cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6a-502. . . .”). This construction of the 
statute gives meaning to every portion of both statutes, and does not leave language 
hollow or superfluous. 
B. Substantially Similar Language Exists Elsewhere in the Code, Always 
Signaling Similarity in the Scope of Prohibited Conduct. 
 
 Further support of this construction is found throughout the criminal code, where 
verbiage substantially similar to “in cases not amounting to a violation of . . .” is found. 
Tellingly, when substantially similar verbiage is used in other portions of the code, it is 
used for the manifest purpose of establishing that the scope of the crime in question is 
similar to, and not different from, the statute being referenced. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-506(2) (“a person who, in the presence of two or more persons, and not 
amounting to a violation of [the aggravated assault statute], draws or exhibits a dangerous 
weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses a dangerous weapon in a 
fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.”), Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
702.7(4)(establishing that voyeurism “under circumstances not amounting to a violation 
of Subsection (1)” is a class B misdemeanor and not a class A misdemeanor), Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-111.1(5)(criminalizing threatening or intimidating a vulnerable adult, a 
witness, or a reporting party in response to a report of abuse of a vulnerable adult, under 
circumstances not amounting to witness tampering), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
109.1(2)(c)(establishing that commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child 
“under circumstances not amounting to” homicide, attempted homicide of a cohabitant, 
or causing serious bodily injury or using a dangerous weapon against a cohabitant is a 
	 17 
class B misdemeanor”), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5 (“Any prisoner who commits 
aggravated assault not amounting to a violation of Section 76-3-203.6 is guilty of: (1) a 
second degree felony if no serious bodily injury was intentionally caused; or (2) a first 
degree felony if serious bodily injury was caused.”). In each of these examples, the “not 
amounting to a violation of. . .” language is used to signal that the scope of the two 
statutes is similar, and not disparate. 
C. The Analytical Approach in State v. Ainsworth, 2016 UT App 2 Supports 
Defendant’s Construction. 
 
 Even further support for this construction is found in State v. Ainsworth, 2016 UT 
App 2. Ainsworth involved a uniform operation of law challenge to Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (the Measurable Amount Statute), which criminalizes negligently driving 
a vehicle with any measurable amount of a Schedule I or II controlled substance in the 
driver’s system while causing death or serious bodily injury to another. A violation of the 
Measurable Amount Statute is a second degree felony. The basis of the challenge was 
that the blameworthiness of a violation of the Measurable Amount Statute is lower than 
the blameworthiness of a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)(a) (the Automobile 
Homicide Statute), and Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) (DUI with Serious Bodily 
Injury). Notwithstanding, a violation of the Measurable Amount Statute was punished as 
a second degree felony, while the more blameworthy offenses of Automobile Homicide 
and DUI with Serious Bodily Injury were listed as third degree felonies. Defendant 
challenged the Measurable Amount Statute, arguing that there was no reasonable basis to 
impose a greater punishment for committing a crime that is less blameworthy under the 
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code. Id. at ¶ 13. 
The State’s defense to this challenge was an argument that the Measurable 
Amount Statute only applies only when the controlled substance was consumed illegally, 
such as without a prescription. Id. at ¶ 14. According to the State, Automobile Homicide 
and DUI with Serious Injury are only implicated when the intoxicant was consumed 
legally. Id. Thus, when the intoxicant was consumed illegally, the State contended that 
the only crime that could apply was the Measurable Amount Statute. Id. The court 
rejected that argument, and in doing so made an observation that is directly germane to 
the point presently sub judice:  
the Measurable Amount Statute implicitly identifies the Automobile 
Homicide Statute as defining an offense that could apply to users of 
illegal drugs by specifically distinguishing it from the Measurable 
Amount Statute, stating that “[a] person is subject to the penalties” of the 
Measurable Amount Statute when the person violates the statute “in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of [the Automobile Homicide 
Statute].” This indicates that the legislature anticipated that the 
Automobile Homicide Statute would apply to nonprescription users of 
controlled substances under certain circumstances. 
 
Id. at ¶ 15 (emphasis and alterations in original). In other words, the State’s argument 
failed because the clause “in an offense not amounting to a violation of” establishes that 
the Measurable Amount Statute and Automobile Statutes are related, and are not 
disparate. Id.  
 Thus, the holding in Ainsworth implicitly relies on interpreting a clause 
substantially similar to the dispositive clause here to mean that both statutes occupy 
similar real estate in terms of the scope of prohibited conduct. The trial court was 
therefore in error when it ruled that the “not amounting to” language removed the concept 
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of impairment from the Metabolite Statute’s scope. To the contrary, while the “not 
amounting to” clause creates a distinction between statutes, as the Ainsworth court 
recognized, the distinction only sets the line of demarcation between the otherwise 
similar criminal offenses.  
 In the end, the trial court’s conclusion that the Metabolite Statute criminalizes 
driving with any metabolite of a controlled substance, irrespective of the metabolite’s 
ability to impair, is not consistent with canons of statutory interpretation, is not consistent 
with other uses of substantially similar language found throughout the criminal code, and 
is not consistent with the Ainsworth court’s analysis of substantially similar language. 
And because the State’s witness testified that the person from whom the blood toxicology 
results he reviewed was drawn would not show any impairment to his ability to drive as a 
result of the THC metabolite, Mr. Outzen’s conduct did not violate Section 41-6a-517, 
the trial court’s ruling and order was in error and should be reversed and the matter 
remanded with instructions to dismiss the charge pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-
517 against Defendant.  
II. Legislative History Shows an Intent to Criminalize the Presence of “Illicit 
Drugs in the System.” 
 
Defendant maintains that the language of the Metabolite Statute is unambiguous 
because his is the only interpretation consistent with the plain language, context, and 
substantially identical language found elsewhere in the criminal code. However, should 
the court determine that the language is ambiguous, the legislative history discloses an 
intent to criminalize driving with impairing metabolites only. 
	 20 
 The Metabolite Statute was passed as Senate Bill 101 in the 1994 legislative 
session, with Senator Craig Peterson as its sponsor. When introducing the bill on 
February 14, 1994, Senator Peterson discussed the presence of “illicit drugs in the 
system” and the difficulty of establishing a level of impairment for drugs, as 
distinguished from the well-known 0.08 blood alcohol concentration per se threshold. 
1994 General Legislative Session SB0101 (Feb. 14, 1994) at approximately 01:41:30 
(accessed at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=15647 
&meta_id=480717). Senator Peterson also noted that his “original intent” with the bill 
was to address the problem that in a large number of cases in which individuals had a 
blood alcohol content between 0.04 and 0.08, the individuals were also found to have 
other drugs “in their system” that caused “erratic behavior” or “inappropriate driving 
skills,” but that those individuals could not be prosecuted for the drug use under the 
statute criminalizing possession. Id. at appx. 01:44:30. The fact that Senator Peterson 
repeatedly referred to having “illicit drugs in the system” and erratic behavior attributable 
to the impairing effects of the drugs supports an intent to criminalize the presence of 
impairing metabolites in a person’s body, but not the presence of non-impairing 
metabolites. 
 The legislative history therefore underscores that the conclusion that the 
Metabolite Statute can only be construed to contemplate impairing metabolites, to the 
exclusion of non-impairing metabolites.  
 Furthermore, defendant notes that his position is consistent with the public policy 
that drives the rule of lenity. That rule requires that once traditional statutory 
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interpretation tools have been consulted, if the statute remains ambiguous, the statute 
should be strictly construed against the State.  See State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 38 FN 
3, 309 P.3d 209 (citing the rule of lenity with approval). So if, after this review of the 
statute, the court still concludes that it is ambiguous, lenity requires that the statute be 
construed against the State. 
III. The Metabolite Statute is an Unconstitutional Status Offense. 
 
As explained in Points I and II above, the proper interpretation of the Metabolite 
Statute is that it contemplates only impairing metabolites, and not non-impairing 
metabolites. However, should the court find plausible the construction of the statute that 
the State advanced below and that the trial court adopted, before considering the 
constitutionality of that statute, it bears remembering the maxim that when faced with 
more than one plausible construction of a statute, courts should avoid a construction that 
suffers from constitutional infirmity. LKL Associates, Inc., 2004 UT 51 at ¶ 9. So the 
constitutional analysis that follows in Points III and IV lends further support to 
Defendant’s construction of the Metabolite Statute advanced in Points I and II above. 
The trial court concluded that the Metabolite Statute is not an unconstitutional 
status offense pursuant to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 
2d 758 (1962) as interpreted by the court in State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 31, 254 
P.3d 183 because the status in question is the status of a driver, and not one who has 
previously consumed controlled substances. On that basis, the trial court concluded that 
the Metabolite Statute does not constitute an impermissible status offense. R. 302. The 
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trial court further reasoned: 
As the Supreme Court of Utah stated in State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, 
the defendant in that case “could have complied with the measurable 
amount provision by choosing to remain outside Utah’s borders until the 
methamphetamine was no longer present in his body.” Id. Similarly, 
Defendant could have complied with the metabolite statute by not getting 
behind the wheel until the THC metabolite was no longer present in her 
body. 
 
R. 302.  
The trial court’s ruling misapprehends the nature of the challenge below and the 
rule as stated in both State v. Robinson and Robinson v. California because it addresses a 
constitutional challenge that was at not at issue here. This portion of the trial court’s 
analysis comes from paragraph 16 of State v. Robinson, which addresses the appellant’s 
due process challenge. State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30 at ¶¶ 11-16. However, a review of 
the record discloses that Mr. Outzen did not raise a due process challenge. This portion of 
the trial court’s conclusion therefore followed the trail of a red herring. 
The portion of State v. Robinson that Defendant actually relied on begins at 
paragraph 28, where the court analyzed the constitutional principles articulated in 
Robinson v. California, where the Court ruled that a statute criminalizing the status of 
being a drug addict was a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at ¶ 29. Ultimately, the 
State v. Robinson court concluded that, based on the facts before it, there was no violation 
of the principles articulated in Robinson v. California. Id. at ¶ 33. 
There is a critical distinction between the facts of State v. Robinson and Robinson 
v. California: the defendant in State v. Robinson had active controlled substances in his 
	 23 
system, whereas the defendant in Robinson v. California had only inactive metabolites in 
his system. Compare State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30 at ¶ 33 with Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. at 662. That distinction drove the result in Robinson v. California because the 
challenged statute could not constitutionally criminalize the status of being a drug user. 
Id. at ¶ 31. It also drove the result in State v. Robinson because the statute at issue 
punished the possession of controlled substances, and not the status of having previously 
consumed them. Id. 
Much like the defendant in Robinson v. California, Defendant in this case did not 
have controlled substances in his system; he only had indicators that he previously had 
controlled substances in his system. Moreover, after evaluation by way of field sobriety 
tests, officers concluded that he was not too impaired to drive. Thus, the trial court’s 
interpretation of the statute criminalized the status of having previously used drugs. Such 
an interpretation violates the mandate of Robinson v. California. 
Furthermore, the trial court relied on a conclusion that the status punished by the 
Metabolite Statute was that of being a driver, and not that of having previously used 
controlled substances. R. 302. That analysis, however, reflects a misapprehension of the 
issue before the court. Defendant never challenged the application of the statute to him on 
the basis of him being a driver because there was never a contention that he should not 
have been driving. He was properly licensed and was not too impaired to drive safely.  
The real issue before the court, therefore, is whether the State can constitutionally 
punish Defendant for the fact that he was driving after having consumed a controlled 
substance, and after he was no longer under the influence of that controlled substance. 
	 24 
The rule under Robinson v. California as construed by the State v. Robinson court is that 
the State cannot. Thus, the trial court construed the statute in a manner that conflicts with 
the rule enunciated in Robinson v. California. Because the statute as applied to this case 
violates those constitutional principles, the trial court should be reversed. 
IV. The Trial Court’s Interpretation of the Metabolite Statute Violates Article 
I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
 
The trial court’s reasoning rejecting Defendant’s uniform operation of law 
challenge can fairly be broken into two components. First, the trial court ruled that the 
Metabolite Statute does not create disparate treatment amongst persons similarly situated. 
R. 302, ¶ 13. Second, the trial court ruled that even if the statute did create disparate 
treatment amongst persons similarly situated, there is a rational basis to do so. Both 
conclusions are defective for reasons explained below. 
A. Article I, § 24 Legal Standards 
 
The supreme court has previously described Article I, § 24 of the Utah 
Constitution as “Utah’s analogue to equal protection under federal law,” but noted that 
the Utah provision may be more rigorous than its federal counterpart because it requires 
similar treatment of persons similarly situated.” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 33, 233 P.3d 
476. Statutes found to treat similarly situated individuals in an unreasonably different 
manner will not pass uniform operation of law scrutiny. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997-
98 (Utah 1995)(holding that a statute authorizing prosecutors to charge juvenile 
defendants as adults on an “arbitrary and standardless” basis violates the uniform 
operation of law Clause of the Utah Constitution). 
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At the outset of uniform operation of law analysis, the court must identify whether 
the challenged classification implicates fundamental or critical rights, or classifications 
considered impermissible or suspect in the abstract. Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 
41, 54 P.3d 1069 (noting that the right to vote is a fundamental right), Ryan v. Gold Cross 
Services, Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995)(noting that the strict scrutiny/rational basis 
standard of review terminology is not helpful because it comes from equal protection 
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also noting that a statute declaring that the 
act of not wearing a seatbelt is not an act of negligence did not implicate fundamental 
rights), Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (noting that Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence is not binding “so long as we do not reach a result that violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.”)(emphasis in original). Cases that involve fundamental rights are 
subject to heightened scrutiny, as compared to cases that do not. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at 
¶ 40. 
“To determine whether a statute violates the uniform operations of laws, [the 
court] appl[ies] a three-step analysis: (1) whether the statute creates any classifications; 
(2) whether the classifications impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly 
situated; and (3) if there is disparate treatment, whether ‘the legislature had any 
reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.’”  State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30 at ¶ 17 
(citations omitted). 
Regarding the third prong of the model, the court noted that “[t]his question 
involves a subsidiary three-part inquiry: (1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) 
whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a 
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reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purpose.”  Id. at ¶ 22 
(citing Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2009 UT 26, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 1089; Drej, 2010 UT 
35, ¶ 34, 233 P.3d 476). And while the legislature enjoys considerable discretion in 
designating the classes to which the statute applies, it is the province of the judiciary to 
decide if the classification operates equally on all persons similarly situated in a manner 
consistent with Article I, § 24. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at ¶ 38. 
With respect to the purpose of the challenged statute, courts “will sustain a 
classification if [they] can reasonably conceive of facts which would justify the 
distinctions or differences in state policy [expressed by the challenged legislation] as 
between different persons.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 
779 P.2d 634, 641 (Utah 1989)(latter alteration in original)(internal citations omitted). 
However, courts are not to accept any conceivable reason for the legislation; they are to 
judge the challenged statute based on reasonable or actual legislative purposes. Id. No 
exact proof of those purposes is required, however, but only purposes that may be 
reasonably imputed to the legislature should be used. Id.  
B. The Trial Court’s Reasoning that the Metabolite Statute Does Not Create 
Disparate Treatment Amongst Persons Similarly Situated Misconstrues 
the Meaning of “Similarly Situated.” 
 
At the outset, Defendant concedes that this case does not involve a fundamental 
right or a suspect classification. The classification in question concerns persons who 
consume controlled substances and drive vehicles, which does not invoke any 
fundamental rights or suspect classifications. Thus, Defendant concedes that the analysis 
proceeds under a more deferential approach. See Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426(“[O]ur 
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determination of whether the challenged statute is reasonably related to legitimate 
legislative objectives does not require a high threshold.”). However, it should be noted 
that this more deferential approach does not relieve the court of its obligation to 
scrutinize the classification for a reasonable basis. Id. Under this approach, it remains the 
court’s duty “to examine the reasonableness of the classification in light of legislative 
objectives.” Id. 
Turning to whether the statute imposes disparate treatment to persons similarly 
situated, the trial court’s rationale was as follows: 
12. The statute does classify, and disparately treat, individuals on the basis 
of the legality or illegality of their underlying drug use; those whose 
underlying use was illegal are subject to the sanctions of the statute, 
while those whose use was lawful are not. 
 
13. However, the statute does not create disparate treatment between 
persons similarly situated because those whose underlying use was 
illegal are not similarly situated to those whose underlying use was 
legal. 
 
R. 302.  
 The most glaring problem with this line of logic is that, if accepted, no statute 
could possibly disparately impact persons similarly situated. All laws create distinctions, 
amongst classes of people and things. Indeed, that is the very thing laws do. See Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 FN. 6 (Utah 1993)(“[E]very legislative act is in one sense 
discriminatory.”). Because laws create these distinctions, there will always be disparate 
impact upon persons. See id. If the upshot of disparate impact is that the disparately 
impacted persons cannot be similarly situated, then Article I, § 24 is reduced to a hollow 
tautology that guarantees that the law must apply “equally to all those whom it applies.” 
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Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 345 
(1949). Given the importance of constitutional guarantees to our system of government, a 
constitutional provision should not be construed to be a hollow promise. 
Moreover, this approach is not consistent with supreme court precedent. For 
example, under this analytical approach the statute at issue in Lee could not have been 
stricken on equal protection grounds. Lee involved a provision in the medical malpractice 
act that treated minor malpractice claimants the same as adult malpractice claimants by 
purporting to exempt the statute of limitations and statute of repose for a medical 
malpractice claim from tolling as a result of the minority of the claimant. Id. at 574. 
Because of that provision, some claimants were never afforded the opportunity to pursue 
their claim because either the statute of limitations and/or statute of repose had run by the 
time the claimant reached the age of majority. Thus, the statute created disparate 
treatment between tort claimants who were either adults or close enough to legal majority 
to assert a claim timely, and minors who would not reach majority prior to their 
malpractice claim becoming time-barred. The Lee court concluded that this violated 
Article I, § 24 because the minors who would not reach majority prior to the statute of 
limitations or repose would never be afforded the opportunity of pursuing their claim. Id. 
at 578. 
Had the Lee court followed the trial court’s approach, it would have concluded 
that minor claimants are not similarly situated because they never had the opportunity to 
bring their suit. The same could be said of the court in Dodge Town Inc. v. Romney, 480 
P.2d 461 (1971), where the court struck a Sunday closing law requiring licensed 
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automobile dealers to close on Sundays, but allowing other businesses to remain open. 
Had the court followed the trial court’s model, the auto dealer would not have been 
similarly situated because it was not allowed to open on Sundays as the other businesses 
were. The end result of this analysis is that, if accepted, no statute could ever exert 
disparate impact over persons similarly situated because no persons disparately impact 
are, as a matter of law, similarly situated. See R. 302 (“the statute does not create 
disparate treatment between persons similarly situated because those whose underlying 
use was illegal are not similarly situated to those whose underlying use was legal.”). 
C. Proper Application of the Uniform Operation of Law Standard Reveals 
that the Metabolite Statute Creates Disparate Treatment Amongst 
Persons Similarly Situated. 
 
Proper application of the standards explained above leads to the conclusion that 
the Metabolite Statute creates disparate treatment between persons similarly situated. The 
Metabolite Statute creates a classification between those who have a metabolite in their 
bodies as a result of illegal, voluntarily use and those who do through legal or involuntary 
use.  Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(3). The classification imposes disparate treatment on 
persons similarly situated because both groups are driving after having consumed a 
controlled substance with metabolites remaining in their system, but only those who 
consumed the controlled substance illegally and voluntarily are subject to sanctions. Id. 
Having cleared the first two hurdles as explained by the Robinson court, the remaining 
question is whether the legislature had a reasonable objective that warrants the disparity. 
State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30 at ¶ 17.  
// 
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D. There is No Rational Nexus Between the Legislative Objective of Public 
Safety and the Chosen Classification. 
 
As explained above, the third inquiry under the uniform operation of law 
analytical framework as explained in State v. Robinson involves three subsidiary areas of 
inquiry: (1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the objectives of the 
legislative action are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship 
between the classification and the legislative purpose.”  Id. at ¶ 22. It should also be 
remembered that courts are not at liberty to imagine a legislative objective; they are 
constrained by “reasonable or actual legislative purpose.” Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 641. 
And while exacting proof of purpose is not required, this court should only use a purpose 
that can reasonably be imputed to the legislature. Id. Defendant therefore respectfully 
submits that the best source for the legislative purpose is in the plain language, supported 
by legislative history. As explained in Points I and II supra, that purpose is public safety. 
i. Analysis of Deterrence of Illegal Drug Use as a Purpose of the 
Metabolite Statute is Improper Under the Facts of This Case. 
 
With respect to the first inquiry, under the facts before the trial court, the trial 
court misconstrued the nature of the classification. The trial court reasoned that 
“[d]istinguishing between legal and illegal drug use is a reasonable classification.” This is 
statement represents a subtle shift away from the issue before the court because it does 
not consider legislative purpose. The purpose of the Metabolite Statute is not to deter 
illegal drug use. Its central purpose is protecting citizens on or near the roadways of the 
state from drivers operating vehicles while under the influence of impairing substances. 
See generally Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517; Points I and II, supra. As a result, its purpose 
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is no more to discourage illegal drug use than it is to generate revenue through the 
assessment of fines,5 or compelling people who have used drugs to go to drug treatment.6 
Those can all be fairly labeled collateral impacts of the statute. But it does not follow that 
those collateral impacts can be imputed as the legislative aims for uniform operation of 
law purposes. Courts are not at liberty to manufacture legislative objectives that are not 
reasonable or manifest purposes of the statute. Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 641. To the extent 
the trial court relied on deterrence of illegal drug use as a legislative goal for uniform 
operation of law purposes, it disregarded the mandate of Blue Cross and is in error.  
Furthermore, including deterrence of illegal drug use as a legislative goal for 
purposes of uniform operation of law analysis took the trial court into constitutionally 
forbidden grounds pursuant to the holding in Robinson v. California. There, the Court 
held that a state cannot constitutionally punish a person for having previously been under 
the influence of controlled substances. See State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30 at ¶ 33. So if a 
purpose of the Metabolite Statute is to deter illegal drug use, under the facts of this case it 
does so by punishing drivers who have previously consumed marijuana but were not 
																																																						
5 The current Uniform Fine/Bail Forfeiture Schedule assesses a fine of $680 plus a 90% 
surcharge per violation of § 41-6a-517. Available at 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/append/c_fineba/FineBail_Schedule.pdf (last 
visited May 5, 2016). 
 
6 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(11) (allowing a court to shorten a mandatory driver 
license suspension period if the driver, inter alia, completes substance abuse treatment if 
found appropriate). Furthermore, in defense counsel’s experience, courts imposing 
sentence for a violation of the Metabolite Statute or driving under the influence related 
crimes uniformly require as a term of probation that the defendant undergo a substance 
abuse evaluation and comply with all treatment recommendations. 
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under its influence while driving. The trial court’s reliance on deterrence of illegal drug 
use as a purpose of the Metabolite Statute was therefore inconsistent with both Robinson 
v. California and State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30 at ¶ 32:  
Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the measurable amount 
provision does not make it a crime for a person to have the metabolite of 
a controlled substance in his body. A metabolite of a controlled 
substance is a byproduct created when the controlled substance is 
metabolized by the body; thus, having the metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the body only indicates that the controlled substance was 
ingested at some prior point in time. In other words, simply having the 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the body is similar to a ‘status’ of 
having previously ingested the controlled substance. 
 
 Thus, the only purpose to the statute that can be properly analyzed under the 
uniform operation of law framework is the purpose of public safety. Specifically, the 
purpose of promoting safety on or near the roadways of the state. With this purpose in 
mind, Defendant will acknowledge that public safety on or near the roadways is a 
legitimate governmental purpose. The other two prongs, however, cannot be satisfied 
under the facts of this case.  
ii. There Is No Reasonable Relationship Between Public Safety and the 
Classification in This Case. 
 
Under the facts of this case, the classification at issue is patently unreasonable and 
cannot be sustained even under the deferential rational basis standard in view of the 
legislative goal. The classification criminalizes driving with pharmacologically inactive 
THC metabolites in one’s system, but only if the THC was consumed voluntarily and 
illegally.  The classification does absolutely nothing to promote public safety.  
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical: suppose Driver A consumed 
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marijuana recreationally in Colorado, where recreational consumption of marijuana is 
legal,7 and operated a vehicle in Utah 5 days later with inactive THC metabolites in her 
system. Suppose also that Driver B voluntarily consumed marijuana in Utah, where 
consumption of marijuana is illegal, and operated a vehicle in Utah 5 days later with 
inactive THC metabolites in his system. 
 Driver A would not be subject to punishment under the Metabolite Statute because 
the “controlled substance was . . . otherwise legally ingested.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-
517(3)(c). Driver B, by contrast, would be subject to punishment under the Metabolite 
Statute because the controlled substance was not legally ingested, by prescription or 
otherwise. 
 The question to which the State must provide a reasonable answer under these 
circumstances is this: What about Driver B makes him/her a greater public safety risk 
than Driver A? One will search in vain for a principled, reasonable answer to that 
question; both Driver A and Driver B pose the same level of public safety risk by virtue 
of having the inactive THC metabolite in his/her system: zero. The only distinction 
between the two is the legality of consumption. But the legal/illegal distinction means 
nothing vis-à-vis public safety. Driver A’s ability to drive safely is unaffected by the 
presence of non-active metabolites in his/her system, and Driver B’s ability to drive 
																																																						
7 Defendant also notes that the same problem would arise if Driver A had consumed 
marijuana involuntarily, or pursuant to a prescription from a provider, both of which are 
also complete defenses under the Metabolite Statute. Furthermore, the same problem 
would arise if a Utah resident were travelling abroad in a country where marijuana 
consumption is legal, and returned to Utah and began driving before the THC metabolite 
had been fully eliminated from his or her system. 
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safely is unaffected by the presence of non-active metabolites in his/her system. The 
legislature has thus created a distinction that has no rational relationship to the purpose 
for which the classification was enacted. The statute violates uniform operation of law, 
and its application to Defendant represents a violation of his uniform operation of law 
rights. The trial court’s ruling and order that the Metabolite Statute did not violate 
uniform operation of law should therefore be reversed.  
Conclusion 
 Because the trial court’s construction of the “in cases not amounting to” verbiage 
in the Metabolite Statute is inconsistent with its plain language, its legislative history, the 
manifest purpose of comparable language found elsewhere in the criminal code, and 
inconsistent with how the court of appeals has previously treated that language, the denial 
of the motion to dismiss was in error. This court should reverse the trial court and remand 
the matter with instructions to dismiss the charges against Defendant with prejudice. 
 However, should this court agree with the trial court’s construction of the statute, 
then the statute violates constitutional principles discussed in State v. Robinson because 
the Metabolite Statute, under the circumstances in the present case, punishes drivers who 
were previously under the influence of a controlled substance. This is an impermissible 
status offense under Robinson v. California.  
 Furthermore, the Metabolite Statute violates the uniform operation of law clause 
of the Utah Constitution because there is no reasonable basis to support the distinction in 
this case. Given the purpose of the statute, viz., public safety, it is patently unreasonable 
to distinguish between unimpaired drivers who voluntarily and illegally consumed a 
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controlled substance from drivers who involuntarily or legally consumed the same 
controlled substance. There is no rational basis to support the apparent belief that illegal 
and voluntary consumers pose a greater public safety risk than involuntary or legal 
consumers, particularly when one considers that the facts of this case involve a non-
impairing metabolite. To put a finer point on it, even the State’s expert conceded that he 
would not anticipate that the subject from whom the blood sample was taken would show 
any signs of impairment due to his or her recent THC consumption. Thus, there is no 
rational basis to support the distinction created to for the putative purpose of promoting 
public safety. 
 The trial court should therefore be reversed and the matter remanded with 
instructions to vacate his conviction and sentence, and dismiss the charges against 
Defendant with prejudice. 
 Respectfully submitted on this, the ___ day of May, 2016. 
 
         ______________________ 
         Dallas B. Young 
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